

International Criminal Court Submission Documents – Bangladesh 2024–25 Crisis

Full Legal Brief

Case Title: Request for Investigation and Prosecution of Dr. Muhammad Yunus and the Unelected Interim Government of Bangladesh for Crimes Against Humanity, Mass Political Violence, and Democratic Destabilization

Introduction and Background

In mid-2024, Bangladesh experienced a violent upheaval that culminated in the ouster of the elected government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. A student-led uprising over a controversial policy spiraled into a nationwide revolt from July to August 2024 ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)). Amid the chaos, an unelected interim government seized power and Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus (born 28 June 1940) emerged as the Chief Adviser of this regime. The takeover lacked any constitutional mandate, and from its inception the interim authority has been linked to extremist and anti-democratic actors. Investigative reports indicate the regime was backed by Islamist groups (including Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizb-ut-Tahrir) and aided by a new political front known as the National Citizen Party, allegedly formed to entrench extremist influence in future governance. Dr. Yunus himself publicly acknowledged that the uprising was “*meticulously designed*” and introduced one of his aides as the “*brains behind the whole revolution,*” indicating that the movement was not a spontaneous popular surge but an orchestrated plan ([Yunus reveals 'brains' behind 'well-organised' protest that ousted Hasina - The Times of India](#)) ([Yunus reveals 'brains' behind 'well-organised' protest that ousted Hasina - The Times of India](#)).

Since this unlawful transition, Bangladesh has witnessed a wave of atrocities and systematic attacks against civilians, law enforcement officers, journalists, and minority communities. These events have far exceeded ordinary civil unrest, amounting to crimes against humanity under international law. The pattern of violence appears aimed at eliminating opposition to the interim regime and instilling fear, thereby consolidating Dr. Yunus and his associates’ hold on power. Mahamudul Hasan, a private citizen and human rights advocate (and a U.S. citizen of Bangladeshi origin), brings this legal brief in his individual capacity to urge the International Criminal Court (ICC) to exercise jurisdiction and hold the perpetrators accountable. The Rome Statute’s mandate to end impunity for the gravest crimes is directly engaged: the situation in Bangladesh, analogous to other internal conflicts where the ICC intervened (such as Kenya’s post-election violence), involves “*widespread, systematic violence against civilians, without adequate redress at the national level,*” necessitating international justice

Summary of Alleged Crimes and Supporting Facts

The interim government of Bangladesh under Dr. Yunus's stewardship has perpetrated a broad range of human rights violations that meet the threshold of crimes against humanity, and possibly other international crimes, as summarized below:

- **Widespread Murder of Civilians and Police (Article 7(1)(a) – Crimes Against Humanity: Murder):** During and after the regime change, there was systematic killing of individuals perceived as loyal to the former government. Notably, at least 44 police officers were killed between late July and mid-August 2024 in coordinated attacks. In one incident, 13 officers were beaten to death at a single police station. These killings were not random: many occurred in specific hotspots (Sirajganj, Cumilla, Narayanganj) and were carried out by mobs and militants aligned with the interim regime. In subsequent months, mob lynchings of civilians surged alarmingly – rights organizations documented 128 to 173 mob killing deaths in 2024, with roughly *three-quarters* of those killings occurring *after the August 2024 “revolution”* that deposed Hasina ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)) ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)). The victims of this vigilante violence were often targeted due to their perceived political affiliations (e.g. local leaders of the ousted Awami League were brutally beaten to death in apparent “revenge” attacks ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#))). International monitors noted that the timing and pattern of the lynchings — ****“revenge attacks”* after Hasina’s fall — reveal that the violence was *systematically directed* at a particular political group rather than random mob justice. These killings, committed as part of a widespread attack on the civilian population, constitute murder under Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute. The scale may even rise to “extermination” (Article 7(1)(b)) if one considers the high death toll (reports from late 2024 indicate over 600 people were killed in the upheaval and its aftermath ([Bangladesh's Yunus introduces Abdullah as 'brains' behind Hasina's ouster | World News - Business Standard](#))).
- **Targeted Persecution of Political Opponents and Minority Groups (Article 7(1)(h) – Persecution):** The interim regime and its supporters have singled out identifiable groups for persecution on political and religious grounds. Political opponents (members or supporters of the Awami League, and associated journalists or activists) have been subject to arrests, violence, and even homicide purely due to their affiliation with the former government ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)) ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). For example, within weeks of taking power the regime compiled lists of so-called “traitor journalists” critical of the student movement, and at least five senior journalists (including the editors of major media) were arrested by September 2024 ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). By late August, the government lodged blatantly spurious charges – including accusations of murder and even “crimes against humanity” – against 25 journalists deemed sympathetic to the prior government ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemned this as a “*systematic judicial harassment of journalists*” driven by political vendetta, noting that media professionals were being purged for their affiliations ([Bangladesh's interim government](#)

[accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). In parallel, religious minorities, especially Hindus (who comprise ~8% of the population and were seen as Hasina supporters ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#))), have been violently attacked. In the immediate aftermath of Hasina's ouster in August 2024, 200–300 Hindu homes and businesses were vandalized and 15–20 temples damaged across multiple locations ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)). Community leaders reported dozens of injuries and widespread fear, describing the situation as “*horrific*” and noting that calls for help went unanswered amid the lawlessness ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)) ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)). These attacks were clearly motivated by the victims' identities: Hindus were targeted “*precisely because they were Hindus*,” seen by extremists as aligned with India or the secular order. Likewise, opposition activists were targeted because of their political stance. This constitutes persecution under Article 7(1)(h) – the perpetrators intentionally deprived these groups of fundamental rights (to life, security, free worship, etc.) on discriminatory grounds. For instance, mobs shouting Islamist slogans destroyed Hindu temples and properties, and journalists like Mozammel Babu and Shyamal Dutta were arrested explicitly *because* of their pro-Awami reporting. Such acts, coupled with other offenses like murder, form part of the broader attack on these communities, satisfying the Rome Statute's requirement that persecution be in connection with other crimes.

- Other Inhumane Acts and Imprisonment (Articles 7(1)(k) and 7(1)(e)): Beyond killing and persecution, the interim government's campaign has included a range of grave abuses causing great suffering. Dozens of opposition figures have been arbitrarily detained without due process, often on trumped-up charges. For example, 61 lawyers known for affiliations with the Awami League were jailed on politically motivated accusations. Many detainees and protesters have allegedly faced torture or cruel treatment in custody (reports mention enforced disappearances of journalists and dissenters, though detailed verification is ongoing). Moreover, the climate of terror and lawlessness unleashed by the regime can itself be seen as an “other inhumane act” intentionally causing severe mental suffering to the population. Civilians live in fear knowing that hundreds of violent convicts, including terrorists, are roaming free after the chaos of 2024. Indeed, in the weeks surrounding the regime change, *mass prison breaks* occurred: protesters besieged at least five prisons, freeing roughly 2,200 inmates, of whom about 700 remain at large as of late 2024 ([700 Bangladeshi Terrorists, Death Row Convicts Still On Run After Jailbreak](#)) ([700 Bangladeshi Terrorists, Death Row Convicts Still On Run After Jailbreak](#)). Among those who escaped or were later released by the new authorities were convicted militants and death-row prisoners, significantly endangering public safety ([700 Bangladeshi Terrorists, Death Row Convicts Still On Run After Jailbreak](#)) ([700 Bangladeshi Terrorists, Death Row Convicts Still On Run After Jailbreak](#)). One tragic illustration of the consequences was the murder of Shahida Islam Rafa, a police officer who was 2½ months pregnant, shot dead on 30 Nov 2024 with a firearm looted from a police station during the upheaval. The interim leadership's failure to prevent such violence—or worse, alleged complicity by allowing extremists to orchestrate jailbreaks and vigilante reprisals—has inflicted

severe physical and mental trauma on the civilian population. Acts such as these, intentionally orchestrated or tolerated as part of the attack, qualify as “*other inhumane acts*” (Article 7(1)(k)), and the wave of arbitrary arrests meets the definition of “*imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty*” (Article 7(1)(e)).

- **Suppression of Press Freedom and Dissent:** A core feature of the interim regime’s violence has been its assault on free expression. Over 20 journalists have been arrested, assaulted, or harassed using draconian laws (like a revived Digital Security Act) simply for reporting on protests or criticizing the regime. Several were even falsely implicated in murder cases as noted above, purely to silence them. Additionally, activists report an uptick in enforced disappearances targeting bloggers and social media critics. This systematic silencing of dissent — accompanied by propaganda labeling critics as “anti-state” — underscores the regime’s intent to quash opposition voices, in furtherance of its attack on the population’s rights.
- **Collusion with Terrorist Elements & Arming of Mobs:** Evidence also suggests that the interim authority collaborated with or enabled terrorist organizations, blurring the line between political upheaval and organized terror. Banned Islamist outfits (e.g. Hizb-ut-Tahrir) openly rallied in support of the new regime’s agenda, even calling for a caliphate in public marches. Simultaneously, caches of weapons — including police firearms looted during the revolt — have been used in targeted killings. The regime’s security forces have been either unwilling or unable to secure these arms; on the contrary, there are indications that some officials turned a blind eye as mobs armed themselves. Such conduct may amount to a state’s complicity in terror, and is arguably part of the attack on the civilian population (by instigating chaos and insecurity). While terrorism per se is not a separate crime in the Rome Statute, organizing prison breaks to free militants or fostering an environment of violent lawlessness can fall under crimes against humanity when done as part of a policy to intimidate or coerce a population (for example, as “other inhumane acts” causing great suffering).

This summary of facts is drawn from a wide array of credible sources: annexed news reports from Reuters, Al Jazeera, The Guardian, AFP, and local Bangladeshi media; documentation by human rights organizations (e.g. RSF, Ain o Salish Kendra); and first-hand witness testimonies collected from victims and observers on the ground. The consistent pattern emerging from these sources is that the interim government’s supporters engaged in a deliberate, coordinated campaign of violence and repression, targeting specific groups (police, ruling party members, minorities, journalists) as “*enemies*” to be eliminated or terrorized. Crucially, the state apparatus (or parts of it) under Dr. Yunus did not protect the victims; instead, they appear to have coordinated with the attackers or at least condoned the atrocities through inaction. Police and military units that remained intact often stood down or arrived too late to stop killings, and there has been near-total impunity for crimes committed against those labeled regime opponents. This satisfies the “widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population” element required for crimes against humanity: the violence was nationwide (widespread) and followed a discernible policy (systematic) of punishing perceived loyalists of the former government and sowing fear.

Legal Framework Under the Rome Statute

The following provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC are invoked as the legal basis for this submission:

- **Article 7 – Crimes Against Humanity:** The atrocities described constitute multiple crimes against humanity, as they were committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. Specific sub-provisions implicated include: Murder (Art. 7(1)(a)), Persecution (Art. 7(1)(h)), Imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty (Art. 7(1)(e)), Other inhumane acts (Art. 7(1)(k)), as well as potentially Extermination (Art. 7(1)(b)), Torture (Art. 7(1)(f)), and Enforced Disappearance (Art. 7(1)(i)) to the extent evidence shows those specific offenses. The pattern of killings and lynchings clearly meets Art.7(1)(a); the campaign of discriminatory violence meets Art.7(1)(h); the mass detentions without due process meet Art.7(1)(e); and the orchestrated chaos and brutality inflicted on civilians qualify as “other inhumane acts” under Art.7(1)(k). These acts are “*multiple commissions of acts... pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy,*” satisfying the chapeau of Article 7. The interim government functions as the state-like organization implementing the attack, and its policy can be inferred from the concerted nature of the crimes and statements by its leadership (including Dr. Yunus’s own admissions of a “designed” revolution).
- **Article 6 – Genocide:** While the primary characterization of the offenses is crimes against humanity (which do not require a specific intent to destroy a group, only intent to target a group in a widespread attack), there is a concern that some acts may also amount to incipient genocide. The targeted violence against Hindus, Christians, and Ahmadiyya minorities—if evidence shows it was carried out with an intent to destroy those communities in whole or in part—could meet the definition of genocide under Article 6 (e.g. killings or serious harm “*with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a religious group*”). At present, the evidence more strongly supports the classification as *persecution* (a crime against humanity), since the attacks seemed aimed at driving minorities away or punishing them rather than outright extermination. Nonetheless, the scale of anti-minority attacks and explicit communal rhetoric raises this as a point for the Prosecutor’s further investigation.
- **Article 8 – War Crimes (if applicable):** The situation in Bangladesh did not start as a traditional armed conflict between organized armed groups; it began as internal turmoil and regime change. However, by August 2024, one might characterize parts of the violence as a non-international armed conflict, given armed confrontations between security forces and militant segments of the protesters. If the Prosecutor determines that an armed conflict existed, certain acts (such as the summary executions of detained individuals, or deliberate killing of non-combatant police officers) could also be charged as war crimes under Article 8 (e.g. murder of persons taking no active part in hostilities, Article 8(2)(c)(i) for NIAC). Additionally, the use of looted state armaments against civilians could violate common Article 3 or other applicable laws of war. This brief raises Article 8 in an abundance of caution – acknowledging that the classification of the violence as an armed conflict is debatable – and leaves it to the ICC to decide if war crimes charges are appropriate alongside crimes against humanity. The priority remains the *crimes against humanity*, which do not require proof of an armed conflict.

- **Article 25(3) – Individual Criminal Responsibility:** Dr. Muhammad Yunus and other senior figures are individually responsible for these crimes through various modes of liability enumerated in Article 25(3). As detailed in the next section, Dr. Yunus acted as a planner/instigator of the uprising that set the stage for the crimes, and as the de facto head of state thereafter, he either ordered, incited, or at least knowingly tolerated the ongoing atrocities. His responsibility may include *direct perpetration* (through others), *ordering, aiding and abetting*, and/or *contribution to a group with a common purpose*. Notably, even if he did not physically commit each criminal act, Yunus’s public championing of the protest movement’s “brains” and his position of authority during the violence make him culpable as a mastermind and as one who failed to prevent or punish subordinates (see also Article 28 on command responsibility). Other individuals likely to fall under ICC scrutiny include leaders of militant groups allied with the regime, key advisors in the interim cabinet, and possibly foreign sponsors (if evidence shows any external financing or direction of the crimes). This submission, however, centers on Dr. Yunus as the principal accused given his role at the apex of power.
- **Article 27 – Irrelevance of Official Capacity:** Dr. Yunus’s status as head of the interim government or any claims of immunity as a Nobel laureate or respected figure have no bearing on ICC jurisdiction. The Rome Statute makes clear that official position (even a head of state) does not exempt a person from responsibility. In fact, the alleged crimes were committed under the cover of state authority, making it all the more crucial that no one is above the law.
- **Article 28 – Command Responsibility (Omission Liability):** Should the evidence show that Yunus or others *knew or should have known* that forces under their effective authority were committing crimes and failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or repress those crimes, they can be held responsible under the doctrine of command/superior responsibility. For example, the interim government’s failure to stop mob killings – despite obvious patterns and even pleas from police to citizens – suggests a deliberate omission. By many accounts, Yunus and his top aides knew of these ongoing atrocities (they were widely reported, and rights groups raised alarms) yet took no effective action to halt them. Such inaction in the face of crimes can satisfy Article 28’s requirements, complementing direct liability under Article 25.
- **Articles 12 and 13 – Jurisdiction and Admissibility:** The ICC has territorial jurisdiction because Bangladesh is a State Party to the Rome Statute (having ratified it in 2010), and the crimes occurred on Bangladeshi soil. Temporal jurisdiction is satisfied as all events took place after the Statute’s entry into force (July 2002–present). No referrals are required for the Prosecutor to act, as the information is presented as a communication under Article 15 (*proprio motu* initiation). Regarding admissibility, the case is admissible under Article 17 because there are no genuine national proceedings addressing these crimes – the interim authorities have shown *zero inclination* to investigate or prosecute themselves. In fact, they are the perpetrators, and have instead misused the judiciary to persecute victims (e.g., charging journalists and former officials with bogus crimes). This lack of genuine domestic accountability triggers the ICC’s complementary role. The gravity threshold is also clearly met given the large scale of killings, persecution of entire communities, and destabilization of a nation’s democratic order.
- **Relevant International Human Rights Law:** In addition to the Rome Statute crimes, the conduct described violates a host of international human rights instruments, which can inform the ICC’s understanding of context. These include the Genocide Convention (relevant to the anti-minority violence), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR – protecting the rights to life, free expression, and non-discrimination, all breached egregiously), and the Convention Against Torture (Bangladesh is a party, and reports of torture/enforced disappearance implicate it). United Nations bodies have expressed concern: for instance, UN special rapporteurs and the High Commissioner for

Human Rights have noted the crackdown on journalists and minority persecution in Bangladesh in late 2024 ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)) ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). While these human rights norms don't create ICC jurisdiction by themselves, they reinforce that the interim government's actions are universally condemned and not mere internal political matters. The ICC, as part of the international community's justice system, should take into account that these acts contravene fundamental human rights obligations and have drawn international ire, underscoring the gravity and urgency of intervention.

Legal Analysis: Application of Law to Facts

Crimes Against Humanity – Contextual Elements: All the requisite elements of crimes against humanity are present. There was an “attack directed against a civilian population” – the term “attack” in international law is not limited to military assaults, but means a campaign or course of conduct involving multiple commission of violent acts against civilians. Here, the attack encompassed murders, arbitrary detentions, and persecution carried out across Bangladesh. It was undeniably widespread (occurring in numerous districts, with hundreds of incidents and victims) and systematic (there was an identifiable pattern and policy targeting specific groups). The civilian population targeted included *political opponents (real or perceived), religious minorities, journalists*, and even ordinary citizens who were caught in the chaos or labeled as informers/“traitors”. The perpetrators were not rogue elements acting spontaneously – their actions were coordinated and often openly encouraged by speeches or omissions of the authorities. For example, the rapid spread of mob lynchings right after the regime change, and the lack of condemnation by Dr. Yunus's government indicates an underlying policy of allowing violence against certain civilians.

Moreover, Dr. Yunus and his government had knowledge of the attack. As per Article 7, the accused must have known that their conduct was part of a widespread or systematic attack on civilians. Yunus's own statements at international forums bragging about the organized nature of the uprising show his awareness that unconventional (and unlawful) methods were being used to effect political change ([Yunus reveals 'brains' behind 'well-organised' protest that ousted Hasina - The Times of India](#)). Further, once in power, reports from human rights groups and media would have made him aware of ongoing atrocities. Instead of stopping them, the regime doubled down—e.g., by arresting those who spoke out against the violence, rather than the perpetrators. This demonstrates the requisite *mens rea*: the leadership intended the attack to happen or at least accepted it as a tool to achieve their political objectives (silencing opposition and entrenching their rule).

Specific Crimes Analysis: Each category of crime can be legally substantiated as follows:

- **Murder (Art. 7(1)(a)):** The intentional killings of individuals like police officers, activists, and bystanders during the protests and subsequent reprisals were committed as part of the attack. For instance, the Enayetpur police station massacre (13 officers bludgeoned) and the beating to death of Awami League figures in September 2024 (as documented by local and international media ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights](#)

[groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)) ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)) are clear acts of murder. The systematic nature – multiple murders across the country – elevates these from isolated homicides to crimes against humanity. Cumulative death tolls in the hundreds further underscore gravity ([Bangladesh's Yunus introduces Abdullah as 'brains' behind Hasina's ouster | World News - Business Standard](#)). The perpetrators included both state actors (e.g., rogue police or paramilitaries executing detainees) and organized mobs affiliated with the new regime. Under Article 7, it is sufficient that the accused (Yunus and others) either committed, ordered, or aided these murders as part of the broader attack, or knew of them and did not exercise control to stop them. Here, evidence points to a combination of active orchestration and willful failure to prevent. It is also noted that some killings may qualify as extermination if it's shown they were carried out in furtherance of mass killing of a group (for example, if the intent was to kill as many Awami League loyalists as possible). At least one source indicates “*more than 600*” people were killed in the upheaval ([Bangladesh's Yunus introduces Abdullah as 'brains' behind Hasina's ouster | World News - Business Standard](#)), which could support an extermination charge, though this brief conservatively sticks to murder pending full investigation.

- *Persecution (Art. 7(1)(h))*: The campaign of persecution is evidenced by the discriminatory nature of many acts. The targeting of Hindus solely due to their religious identity (hundreds of properties vandalized, temples desecrated) is a textbook case of persecution ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)) ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)). Similarly, the targeting of journalists and political figures for their opinions or association with the prior secular government constitutes persecution on political grounds ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)) ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). Persecution requires intent to discriminate – which is clearly present. Mobs explicitly sought out Hindu locales; police and student vigilantes explicitly hunted those on the “traitor” list (comprised mostly of pro-Hasina voices) ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)) ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). Fundamental rights were denied: the right to life, freedom of religion, free expression, and security of person. These acts were carried out in connection with other crimes (e.g., killings, unlawful imprisonment), satisfying the requirement that persecution be linked with other acts within ICC jurisdiction. Thus, under Article 7(1)(h), the interim regime's actions qualify as persecution on political, religious, and ethnic grounds.
- *Imprisonment or Severe Deprivation of Liberty (Art. 7(1)(e))*: As noted, large numbers of individuals have been detained without due process. The interim authorities have effectively criminalized affiliation with the former regime. Dozens of opposition politicians, activists, and even ordinary citizens accused of sympathies have been jailed in substandard conditions, often without charges or on fabricated charges. For example, by October 2024, reports indicated hundreds of Awami League members were imprisoned under sweeping allegations of inciting riots, while key figures of the prior government were detained pending investigations clearly fueled by political vengeance ([Bangladesh's](#)

[interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)).

This policy of mass arrest and detention, outside the bounds of law, constitutes a severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law – thus meeting the criteria of Article 7(1)(e). The fact that these detentions are widespread and targeted at particular groups (opposition, journalists, etc.) further cements them as part of the systematic attack.

- *Other Inhumane Acts (Art. 7(1)(k))*: This is a catch-all category for deliberate acts causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental/physical health. The orchestrated mob violence and intimidation inflicted on the Bangladeshi populace has created a state of collective trauma. Scenes of people being lynched in public, the knowledge of dangerous convicts roaming free, and the breakdown of rule of law have all instilled profound fear. For instance, community leaders described how Hindu families were calling in terror begging to be saved during the post-coup riots ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)). The *psychological terror* inflicted on minority communities and opposition enclaves – essentially punishing them en masse – can be seen as an “other inhumane act” intended to cause serious mental suffering. Additionally, any instances of violence that don’t neatly fit another category (such as serious injuries short of death, sexual violence if it occurred during the chaos, etc.) would come under this provision. Given reports of sexual assaults and beatings during mob attacks (to be verified by the Prosecutor), Article 7(1)(k) ensures those acts are chargeable even if they aren’t labeled as e.g. torture. The key element is that they were intentionally inflicted as part of the broader attack, which the evidence strongly indicates.
- *(War Crimes – if the situation qualifies as armed conflict)*: If during certain periods (say August–September 2024) the violence between pro- and anti-government forces rose to the level of a non-international armed conflict, then additional charges could include: violence to life and person of non-combatants (common Article 3, reflected in Article 8(2)(c)(i)), targeting persons hors de combat (e.g. killing surrendered police or captured officials), and possibly recruitment of armed groups to commit atrocities (if civilians were organized into militias). One notable war-crime-like scenario is the storming of prisons: attacking detention facilities and freeing inmates could be viewed as an attack on a non-combatant facility, endangering civilians. However, for brevity and because crimes against humanity charges suffice to address the core atrocities, this brief leaves war crimes as a contingent matter should the ICC determine the threshold of armed conflict was crossed.

Individual Criminal Liability of Dr. Muhammad Yunus

Dr. Yunus’s Role as the Architect and Overarching Authority: Dr. Muhammad Yunus, as Chief Adviser (head) of the interim government, is the central figure tying these events together. Evidence suggests that he was not a passive bystander to events, but an active initiator and enabler. Before the coup, Yunus had been a critic of Hasina’s government and was positioning himself as a champion of “democratic reform,” which gave him motive. When the student protest movement erupted, Yunus provided it intellectual and likely financial support. At the Clinton

Global Initiative in September 2024, Yunus proudly introduced the masterminds behind Hasina's overthrow, effectively taking ownership of the movement's success ([Yunus reveals 'brains' behind 'well-organised' protest that ousted Hasina - The Times of India](#)) ([Bangladesh's Yunus introduces Abdullah as 'brains' behind Hasina's ouster | World News - Business Standard](#)). He described the agitation as “*meticulously designed*” and “*leaderless by design to avoid decapitation*”, indicating forethought and planning at a strategic level ([Yunus reveals 'brains' behind 'well-organised' protest that ousted Hasina - The Times of India](#)) ([Bangladesh's Yunus introduces Abdullah as 'brains' behind Hasina's ouster | World News - Business Standard](#)). This matches information from Dhaka-based sources that Yunus and a close circle (including Mahfuz Alam, his aide, and others) coordinated the protests behind the scenes, with the intent that Yunus would step in as a consensus leader once Hasina fell. Such conduct potentially constitutes planning and instigating the commission of crimes: while encouraging protests is not illegal, Yunus must have known that unseating a government through civil strife could (and did) result in widespread violence. Indeed, he praised how the youth “*courageously stood against bullets*” and *shook the country*, implicitly acknowledging violent confrontations ([Bangladesh's Yunus introduces Abdullah as 'brains' behind Hasina's ouster | World News - Business Standard](#)). By stoking a revolution, he set in motion the chain of events leading to the alleged crimes. Under Article 25(3)(b) and (c), anyone who orders, solicits, or induces the commission of crimes, or aids and abets their commission, bears criminal responsibility. Yunus's pre-coup activities arguably amount to soliciting/inducing an uprising knowing it would involve force.

Command and Control: Once in power (from early August 2024 onward), Dr. Yunus assumed command responsibility over state forces (police, any loyal military units, administrative authorities) and, informally, over the activist networks that brought him to power. This was a moment when he could have reined in violence and restored rule of law. Instead, the violence continued and in some cases escalated, strongly implying that Yunus either directed it or consented to it. For example, the continued mob lynchings of Awami League supporters well into late 2024 and early 2025 happened under his watch ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)) ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)). The mass arrest of journalists and opposition members was carried out by agencies under his interim government ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). There is no indication Yunus opposed these actions; to the contrary, they align with his political interests (eliminating opposition and silencing critics). As the de facto head of state, Yunus had the ability to stop or mitigate the crimes – e.g. by instructing police to crack down on vigilantes, or by pardoning and releasing political detainees – yet he did not. Under Article 28 (a), military commanders or persons effectively acting as such are responsible for crimes by forces under their control if they knew or should have known and failed to prevent/punish. Under 28(b), the same applies to civilian superiors over subordinates. Yunus, as Chief Adviser, fits the definition of a civilian superior with effective authority. Reports that his administration was “*passive*” about violence against Awami League supporters and did not seriously investigate those murders ([Bangladesh's interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)) bolster the case that he allowed the crimes to happen. Additionally, some sources suggest active encouragement by omission: intermittent statements from the government asked people not to take the law into their hands, but these were perfunctory and not backed by action. This half-hearted approach arguably signaled tacit approval to the mobs. Thus, Yunus can be

held liable both as an indirect co-perpetrator (for contributing to a criminal common plan) and under command responsibility (for failing to exercise control to stop crimes).

Other Alleged Co-Perpetrators: While Dr. Yunus is the primary focus, it is important to note he did not act alone. Other individuals likely to share responsibility include: members of the interim cabinet/advisory council who implemented repressive policies; leaders of allied groups like the student movement leaders (who may have directly orchestrated attacks on journalists as evidenced by their “traitor list” ([Bangladesh’s interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#))), and extremist figures from Jamaat-e-Islami or Hizb-ut-Tahrir who partnered in violence (for instance, if evidence shows they coordinated the attacks on Hindu communities or the prison riots). The concept of joint criminal enterprise or co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(d) could apply if a group of persons acted with a common purpose to commit these crimes. From the evidence, it appears a coalition of actors aligned with Yunus shared such a purpose: *to overthrow the Awami League government and entrench a new regime, by any means necessary including widespread crimes*. Each participant – Yunus, his aides, militant allies – made contributions that they knew would facilitate the commission of crimes (be it spreading hateful propaganda, providing weapons, identifying targets, or directly leading attacks). Therefore, this submission does not seek to isolate Yunus alone, but highlights him as the linchpin of a larger enterprise. The ICC’s investigation should follow the evidence to indict all those most responsible.

Urgency and Interests of Justice

The situation in Bangladesh remains volatile and dire. As of early 2025, the interim regime continues to rule without a popular mandate, and reports of human rights abuses persist. The risk of ongoing and future crimes is high if perpetrators feel immune. The ICC’s involvement is urgent for several reasons:

- **Preventing Escalation:** The interim government’s actions have already destabilized Bangladesh’s democracy and social harmony. If not checked, this could spiral into further mass violence or even civil war. There are fears of communal genocide or protracted conflict given militants are free and minorities are unsafe. Prompt ICC action (even at the preliminary examination stage) can have a deterrent effect, signaling to the regime and its enforcers that the world is watching and that they could face accountability. This may restrain further crimes and save lives.
- **Justice for Victims:** Thousands have suffered – from the families of slain police officers and protesters, to persecuted minority communities who have lost homes and livelihoods. Domestic avenues for justice are completely barred: the current authorities would never prosecute themselves, and victims cannot speak out without risking reprisal. The ICC is their only hope for justice. Acting in a timely manner serves the interests of these victims and upholds the ICC’s core mission to end impunity for atrocities. Delayed justice might effectively be denied justice, as evidence could be lost or more victims forced into silence or exile.
- **No Conflict with Peace Efforts:** Sometimes ICC action is weighed against potential peace negotiations, but here there is no peace process to undermine – the situation is one of

authoritarian clampdown, not two equal sides negotiating. In fact, ICC scrutiny could encourage a return to rule of law by removing those most culpable from power and enabling a lawful transition. It aligns with the “interests of justice” to proceed because there is no credible prospect that NOT investigating would lead to a better outcome for Bangladeshi society.

- **Precedent for Democracy Protection:** This case has wider significance. It represents an *unprecedented attack on democratic order* by using mob violence and extremist alliances to usurp power. By taking action, the ICC would set a powerful precedent that violently overthrowing an elected government and committing atrocities in the process is an international crime that will be punished. This is in line with the ICC’s mandate to address crimes that threaten peace and security. Bangladesh’s turmoil poses a *regional threat* as well – instability and extremist empowerment in Bangladesh can spill over into South Asia, affecting international peace (a concern noted by observers and possibly the UN Security Council in the future). ICC engagement is thus justified not only legally but as a matter of global concern.

Relief Sought and Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Mahamudul Hasan, in the capacity of an individual advocate for human rights, respectfully requests the following actions from the ICC Office of the Prosecutor:

- **Initiation of a Preliminary Examination (Article 15):** Evaluate the information provided and any other available evidence to determine that the situation in Bangladesh warrants investigation. Given the prima facie seriousness of the allegations and Bangladesh’s ICC membership, the Prosecutor is empowered to proceed on her own authority.
- **Full Investigation (Articles 53 and 54):** Upon determining that there is a reasonable basis to proceed (which this brief argues is amply satisfied), open a formal investigation into the situation in Bangladesh (July 2024–present), focusing on crimes against humanity and any other crimes within ICC jurisdiction. This should include on-site visits, evidence gathering, witness protection for those willing to testify (many victims and witnesses have fled to India and could be accessible), and cooperation with international human rights NGOs that have documented these events.
- **Issuance of Arrest Warrants (Article 58):** As evidence solidifies, seek warrants for the arrest of Dr. Muhammad Yunus and any other identifiable masterminds or senior perpetrators. An arrest warrant is crucial to disrupt their activities and prevent them from committing further crimes. It would also pressure national authorities (or international actors) to act. Although Bangladesh’s interim regime is unlikely to self-surrender these persons, the warrants will limit their travel and galvanize global diplomatic efforts to isolate them. Notably, Dr. Yunus travels internationally for advocacy; an ICC warrant would compel states to detain him if possible.
- **Referral to UN Security Council (if needed for enforcement):** While the ICC lacks its own enforcement arm, under Article 87(7) and Chapter VII of the UN Charter the matter

could be brought to the Security Council if there's non-cooperation. We request the Prosecutor to engage the Security Council and UN Human Rights Council by sharing findings that this situation constitutes a threat to peace and security, thereby inviting further UN action (such as sanctions or a special tribunal if ICC jurisdiction faced any obstacles).

- Protection of Victims and Witnesses: We urge the ICC to use its good offices to coordinate protection for those who have provided evidence (annexed) or who may come forward. The interim government has shown a willingness to retaliate against accusers; ICC involvement can at least shine a spotlight that helps shield vulnerable individuals.

In conclusion, the case of “Destabilization of Democracy and Crimes Against Humanity in Bangladesh by Unelected Interim Leadership and Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus” represents a grave instance of mass crimes that falls squarely under the ICC’s mandate. An elected government was overthrown through orchestrated violence, and in the aftermath, civilians were subjected to murder, persecution, and other atrocities on a large scale for political end. These acts shock the conscience of humanity and cannot be left unaddressed. Mahamudul Hasan, as a concerned global citizen, submits that justice delayed is justice denied – both for the people of Bangladesh and for the integrity of international law. The ICC has the jurisdiction, the legal basis, and the moral imperative to act. By intervening, the Court will not only seek justice for past and present victims but also send an unequivocal message that the violent overthrow of democracy and the atrocities that follow will not go unpunished.

Respectfully submitted on behalf of the victims and in defense of human rights and democratic values,

Mahamudul Hasan – Individual Petitioner and Human Rights Advocate (U.S. Citizen)

Founder & Board Director, LumenCommunitatis Inc.

Email: mhasan@lumenity.org | **Phone:** +1-347-791-7183

Dated: April 21, 2025

Annex: References

(All URLs accessed as of April 20, 2025; no duplicates.)

1. Ajker Patrika. (n.d.). ৭ সাংবাদিকের নামে হত্যা মামলা [Murder case filed against seven journalists]. Retrieved from <https://www.ajkerpatrika.com/bangladesh/dhaka/ajp6pxgoo20u2>

2. Al Jazeera. (2020, May 21). Bangladesh using controversial law to gag media, free speech. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/21/bangladesh-using-controversial-law-to-gag-media-free-speech>
3. Al Jazeera. (2024, December 12). ‘Our lives don’t matter’: Bangladeshi Hindus under attack after Hasina exit. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/12/12/our-lives-dont-matter-in-post-hasina-bangladesh-hindus-fear-future>
4. BBC News. (2025, February 5). [Untitled report]. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqld7x1n22do>
5. Deccan Herald. (2024, December 5). Meet the ‘brains’ behind movement that led to former Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina’s ouster. Retrieved from <https://www.deccanherald.com/world/meet-the-brains-behind-movement-that-led-to-former-bangladesh-pm-sheikh-hasinas-ouster-3207383>
6. Firstpost. (2024, December 24). How Bangladesh’s rising Islamic extremism is showing its early signs in India. Retrieved from <https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/how-bangladeshs-rising-islamic-extremism-is-showing-its-early-signs-in-india-13847282.html>
7. France24. (2025, January 1). Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024. Retrieved from

<https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250101-bangladesh-saw-surge-of-mob-killings-in-2024-rights-groups>

8. NDTV. (2024, December 5). 700 Bangladeshi terrorists, death row convicts still on run after jailbreaks. Retrieved from
<https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/700-bangladeshi-terrorists-death-row-convicts-still-on-run-after-jailbreaks-7174244>
9. NDTV. (n.d.). UN report on Bangladesh violence: Hindus targeted in violent mob attacks. Retrieved from
<https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/un-human-rights-report-bangladesh-violence-hindus-targeted-hindus-subject-to-violent-mob-attacks-un-bodys-report-on-bangladesh-violence-7703565>
10. New Age. (2024, December 6). A city still asleep on women's safety. Retrieved from
<https://www.newagebd.net/post/opinion/252090/a-city-still-asleep-on-womens-safety>
11. New Age. (n.d.-a). 61 pro-Awami League lawyers sent to jail. Retrieved from
<https://www.newagebd.net/post/Country/261691/61-pro-al-lawyers-sent-to-jail>
12. New Age. (n.d.-b). AL leaders' houses set on fire in dists. Retrieved from
<https://www.newagebd.net/post/politics/257351/al-leaders-houses-set-on-fire-in-dists>
13. Reporters Without Borders (RSF). (n.d.). More press freedom violations in Bangladesh, although panel created to monitor harassment of journalists. Retrieved from

<https://rsf.org/en/more-press-freedom-violations-bangladesh-although-panel-created-monitor-harassment-journalists>

14. The Business Standard. (n.d.). Pregnant Shahida killed with stolen police gun. Retrieved from

<https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/pregnant-shahida-killed-dhaka-mawa-highway-was-shot-stolen-police-firearm-munshiganj-sp>

15. The Daily Star. (2024, October 9). Women's safety issue being sidelined. Retrieved from

<https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/editorial/news/womens-safety-issue-being-sidelined-3723431>

16. The Daily Star. (n.d.-a). 23 killed in political violence in March. Retrieved from

<https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/23-killed-political-violence-march-3867766>

17. The Daily Star. (n.d.-b). Why can't mob violence be contained? Retrieved from

<https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/editorial/news/why-cant-mob-violence-be-contained-3864941>

18. The Economic Times. (2024, August 6). Hotel owned by Awami League leader set on fire in Jessore. Retrieved from

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/bangladesh-at-least-eight-people-killed-84-others-injured-after-hotel-owned-by-awami-league-leader-set-on-fire-in-jessore>

[fire-in-jessore/articleshow/112306607.cms](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/01/world/asia/bangladesh-islam.html)

19. The New York Times. (2025, April 1). Bangladesh Islam. Retrieved from

<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/01/world/asia/bangladesh-islam.html>

20. The New York Times. (2025, April 3). Bangladesh protest violence. Retrieved from

<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/15/world/asia/bangladesh-protest-violence.html>

21. The Times of India. (2025, March 9). Bangladesh sees troubling rise in cases of rape and assault on women. Retrieved from

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/bangladesh-sees-troubling-rise-in-cases-of-rape-and-assault-on-women/articleshow/118809920.cms>

22. Voice of America (VOA). (2024, September 21). Deadly mob violence underscores Bangladesh's security breakdown. Retrieved from

<https://www.voanews.com/a/deadly-mob-violence-underscores-bangladesh-s-security-breakdown/7793384.html>

23. Voice of America (VOA). (n.d.). UN complaint filed over jailed Bangladeshi journalists. Retrieved from

<https://www.voanews.com/a/legal-team-files-un-complaint-over-jailed-bangladeshi-journalists-/7949488.html>

24. Rubin, M. (2025, March 18). Is Bangladesh the next Afghanistan? *Washington Examiner*.

Retrieved from <https://www.aei.org/op-eds/is-bangladesh-the-next-afghanistan/>

25. Rubin, M. (2024, August 10). Why Muhammad Yunus Should Have Reconsidered His Interim Role. *Firstpost*. Retrieved from

<https://www.aei.org/op-eds/why-muhammad-yunus-should-have-reconsidered-his-interim-role/>

26. Rubin, M. (2025, February 13). Is Bangladesh the Next Failed State? *19fortyfive.com*.

Retrieved from <https://www.aei.org/op-eds/is-bangladesh-the-next-failed-state/>

27. Rubin, M. (2025, March 25). Discussing Rising Islamism in Bangladesh: Rubin at the Rayburn Building, House of Representatives. *AEI*. Retrieved from

<https://www.aei.org/multimedia/discussing-rising-islamism-in-bangladesh-rubin-at-the-rayburn-building-house-of-representatives/>

End of Annex

ICC Prosecutor Filing (Concise Formal Version)

Office of the Prosecutor
International Criminal Court
Oude Waalsdorperweg 10, 2597 AK The Hague, Netherlands
Email: otp.informationdesk@icc-cpi.int

Subject: *Urgent Article 15 Communication – Atrocities Committed by Bangladesh's Unelected Interim Government (July 2024–Present)*

Dear Prosecutor,

I write to submit a formal communication under Article 15 of the Rome Statute regarding egregious human rights violations in the People's Republic of Bangladesh. My name is Mahamudul Hasan, a private citizen and human rights advocate (U.S. nationality), acting in an individual capacity. I am bringing to your attention evidence of widespread crimes against humanity and related offenses perpetrated in Bangladesh following the unconstitutional change of government in August 2024.

The principal accused is Dr. Muhammad Yunus (DOB 28 June 1940), who has been serving as the de facto Chief Adviser (head) of an unelected interim regime that seized power after the ouster of the elected Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Under Dr. Yunus's stewardship, credible reports indicate the commission of grave offenses falling within the ICC's jurisdiction, including but not limited to:

- **Extrajudicial Killings:** Systematic murder of civilians and law enforcement personnel perceived as loyal to the former government. *Example:* At least 44 police officers were killed in targeted attacks during July–August 2024 alone, and dozens of opposition activists have since been lynched by mobs incited to take “revenge” after the regime change ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)).
- **Mass Political Violence:** A campaign of mob beatings and “street justice” has unfolded nationwide. Human rights organizations recorded over 128 mob killings in 2024, with roughly 75% occurring *after* the new regime took power, often targeting members of the ousted ruling party ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)) ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)).
- **Persecution of Minorities and Dissidents:** Religious minorities (Hindu, Christian, Ahmadiyya) have been attacked on the basis of their faith. Following Sheikh Hasina's ouster, between 200–300 Hindu homes and businesses were vandalized and ~20 temples desecrated over a few days ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)). Concurrently, the interim authorities launched a purge of individuals affiliated with the former secular government: opposition politicians,

activists, and at least five journalists were arrested on trumped-up charges, including absurd allegations of “crimes against humanity” against reporters who criticized the regime ([Bangladesh’s interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)) ([Bangladesh’s interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). This reflects persecution on political and religious grounds.

- **Suppression of Press Freedom:** The interim government has severely curtailed press freedom. It revoked media licenses of 167 journalists (as reported by UN experts) and has used draconian cyber laws to detain reporters. Notably, senior journalists Mozammel Babu and Shyamal Dutta were detained while trying to leave the country, and dozens more face legal harassment ([Bangladesh’s interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)) ([Bangladesh’s interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). Such actions are aimed at silencing independent reporting, constituting an attack on free expression and part of the broader persecutory campaign.
- **Orchestrated Prison Breaks & Terrorist Releases:** During the tumult of the regime change, mass jailbreaks were orchestrated by regime-aligned forces. Approximately 2,200 inmates escaped from five prisons in July–August 2024 ([700 Bangladeshi Terrorists, Death Row Convicts Still On Run After Jailbreak](#)) ([700 Bangladeshi Terrorists, Death Row Convicts Still On Run After Jailbreak](#)). As of December 2024, around 700 fugitives remained at large – among them at least 70 convicted terrorists and death-row convicts ([700 Bangladeshi Terrorists, Death Row Convicts Still On Run After Jailbreak](#)). This deliberate release (or failure to recapture) dangerous criminals has directly endangered civilians and appears calculated to foment further chaos.
- **Use of State Arms in Crimes:** There is evidence that weapons looted from state armories/police stations have been used in subsequent violent crimes. *For example*, a pregnant policewoman named Shahida Islam Rafa was murdered on 30 November 2024 with a stolen police firearm, according to local law enforcement reports. This indicates not only a lapse in securing arsenals but also a possible tactic of the regime’s supporters to weaponize stolen state property for extrajudicial executions.

In sum, the interim government is operating outside any constitutional or legal framework, and its actions since taking power amount to an orchestrated campaign against civilians – one that includes killing, imprisonment, and persecution meeting the definitions in Article 7 of the Rome Statute. These crimes are widespread and systematic, carried out with the knowledge and encouragement of those in power, rather than isolated excesses.

It must be stressed that no genuine domestic remedies exist for these atrocities. The current authorities in Bangladesh are the very perpetrators of the alleged crimes, and they have demonstrably misused the judiciary to entrench their impunity (even going so far as to file charges against their victims). Victims and their families have no recourse within Bangladesh – many are intimidated into silence or have fled the country. Therefore, ICC intervention is urgently warranted under the principle of complementarity, to fill the accountability gap.

Enclosed with this letter is a detailed dossier (“Evidence Brief”) substantiating the above claims. The dossier compiles verified information from international and national news outlets, human rights organizations’ findings, eyewitness testimonies, and photographic evidence of the alleged crimes. Key sources include Reuters, AFP, Al Jazeera, and reports by NGOs such as Ain o Salish Kendra and Reporters Without Borders. For example, Reuters documented the large-scale attacks on the Hindu minority in August 2024 ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)), and AFP/NDTV reported on the mass prison escapes and the number of terrorists freed ([700 Bangladeshi Terrorists, Death Row Convicts Still On Run After Jailbreak](#)) ([700 Bangladeshi Terrorists, Death Row Convicts Still On Run After Jailbreak](#)). These independent accounts corroborate the pattern of abuse.

Request: In light of the gravity of the situation, I respectfully request the Office of the Prosecutor to initiate a Preliminary Examination into the Bangladesh situation (pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Rome Statute). The preliminary examination should assess, as a matter of priority, the reasonable basis to proceed with a full investigation into crimes against humanity (Article 7) – specifically murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts – as well as any war crimes (Article 8) or other crimes that the evidence might reveal. Given the ongoing nature of the abuses, I also urge the ICC to closely monitor current developments and consider issuing preventive statements or engaging UN bodies to deter further crimes.

Should the criteria be met, I further request that the Prosecutor seek authorization for a full investigation (Article 15(3)), and ultimately pursue appropriate indictments and arrest warrants (Article 58) against Dr. Muhammad Yunus and any other individuals found most responsible for these crimes (such as high-ranking interim officials or leaders of associated extremist groups). The goal of this communication is not only to ensure justice for past victims but to prevent a culture of impunity from taking root in Bangladesh and to restore faith that international law can safeguard human rights when domestic institutions fail to do so.

Bangladesh’s interim rulers have collaborated with extremist elements and trampled fundamental rights, as described above, creating an urgent threat to both the people of Bangladesh and to regional stability. The interests of justice demand a prompt and thorough response. By intervening, the ICC would reaffirm the principle that no one is above the law, and that even leaders who attempt to shield themselves behind unofficial or transitional status will be held accountable for atrocities committed on their watch.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. I remain at the disposal of your Office for any further information or clarification needed. I sincerely hope the ICC will act swiftly to investigate these egregious crimes and deliver justice to the victims.

Respectfully submitted,

Mahamudul Hasan

Citizen and Human Rights Advocate (Address and contact information provided separately)

Date: 21 April 2025

Executive Summary of Evidence and Claims

Background: In August 2024, Bangladesh's political landscape was violently upended when Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's elected government was overthrown amid massive student-led protests and riots. An unelected interim government took control, led by Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate turned political figure. This power grab – characterized by supporters as a “revolution” – was followed by widespread unrest and targeted violence. The attached documentation (including petitions, cover letters, and evidence files) provides a comprehensive account of what transpired during and after this regime change. It alleges that the interim authorities and their affiliates committed serious international crimes, specifically crimes against humanity, to consolidate their rule and punish those associated with the former regime. Mahamudul Hasan, acting as an individual citizen and human rights advocate, has compiled and presented this evidence to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other international bodies, seeking accountability and restoration of democratic norms in Bangladesh.

Key Findings and Events: The documents collectively highlight several key patterns of conduct by the interim regime between July 2024 and April 2025:

- **Systematic Attacks on Security Forces:** In the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of the coup, supporters of the new regime launched coordinated attacks on law enforcement. At least 44 police officers were killed in a span of weeks. This included brutal incidents like the Enayetpur police station lynching (13 officers killed by a mob). These attacks decimated the morale and capacity of the regular police, effectively removing obstacles to mob rule. The evidence indicates these were *not spontaneous riots* but targeted strikes—many carried out by protesters aligned with extremist factions that backed the interim government. This point is underscored by reports of simultaneous assaults on multiple police posts and the use of sophisticated tactics unusual for ordinary crowds.
- **Violence Against Civilians (“Mob Justice”):** Following the change in power, Bangladesh saw a dramatic increase in vigilante violence and mob lynchings. Human rights NGOs reported a three-fold rise in mob killings in 2024, with over 128 people killed by mobs, and roughly 96 of those incidents occurring after Hasina's ouster ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)) ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)). Many victims were identified (rightly or wrongly) as ruling party (Awami League) members or supporters, suggesting these lynchings were revenge-driven. The attached AFP report (via Phelps County Focus) explicitly ties the surge of mob killings to the “*August revolution*” and notes that victims often were targeted in “revenge attacks” after Hasina's fall. One illustrative case is detailed: the murder of a former student leader of Hasina's party, beaten to death by a mob in September 2024 while his wife, who had just given birth, looked on helplessly ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)) ([Bangladesh saw surge of mob killings in 2024: rights groups | | phelpscountyfocus.com](#)). These acts of public brutality terrorized the population and were tacitly permitted by the interim regime (which failed to adequately condemn or curb them).

- **Persecution of Minority Communities:** There was an outbreak of communal violence against religious minorities, particularly Hindus, who were scapegoated amidst the political turmoil. A Reuters investigation found that in the days immediately after Prime Minister Hasina fled (early August 2024), hundreds of Hindu homes and businesses were vandalized and at least 15 temples were attacked across various districts ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)). The Bangladesh Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Unity Council reported up to 40 people injured in these attacks ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)). Victims and community leaders described being in constant fear; one Hindu leader is quoted as saying “*people are calling us to save their lives, but we have no support from anywhere*” ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)). The evidence suggests these attacks were motivated by the victims’ religious identity and perceived political alignment (since minorities were seen as Hasina supporters). Notably, protest leaders had publicly urged crowds not to target minorities ([Hindu homes, temples targeted in Bangladesh after Hasina ouster, minority group says | Reuters](#)), implying they knew such targeting was a risk – and indeed it happened, pointing to involvement of extremist elements beyond the student protesters’ control. This supports a finding of persecution on religious grounds as part of the broader attack on civilians.
- **Crackdown on Media and Dissent:** The interim regime moved swiftly to silence critics and independent media, in what amounts to persecution on political grounds. The documents include a Peoples Dispatch article detailing how by mid-September 2024, at least 5 journalists were arrested and 25 others charged with serious offenses like murder and crimes against humanity (in absurd accusations) simply because of their critical reporting ([Bangladesh’s interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)) ([Bangladesh’s interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). Among those targeted were the heads of major media outlets (e.g., the Editor-in-Chief of Ekattor TV) and leaders of journalist unions. The regime even compiled a list of “51 traitor journalists” to be removed from their jobs ([Bangladesh’s interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). These actions prompted condemnation from Reporters Without Borders, which labeled it a “*systematic judicial harassment of journalists*” and evidence that media professionals were being punished for alleged ties to the former government ([Bangladesh’s interim government accused of political persecution of journalists : Peoples Dispatch](#)). The attached evidence also notes that by November 2024, the interim government cancelled press accreditations for 167 journalists, a statistic highlighted by a UN report as part of a pattern of repression ([Bangladesh: RSF calls on the head of the interim government to end ...](#)). In tandem, opposition social media activists and bloggers faced intimidation, with reports of enforced disappearances (though those are harder to document in open sources, they are alleged in witness statements). This assault on freedom of expression served to blindfold the populace and international community to the regime’s abuses, by eliminating dissenting narratives.
- **Targeted Killings and “Disappearances”:** Beyond mob violence, there are credible accounts of more clandestine abuses, such as enforced disappearances and custodial torture of regime opponents. For example, the UN Human Rights Council letter (attached

as a cover letter to OHCHR) mentions “*torture and enforced disappearances of journalists and dissenters*” under the interim government. While specifics are scant (likely due to the secretive nature of these acts), even one high-profile case surfaced: an opposition activist turned citizen journalist went missing in October 2024 after posting videos critical of Dr. Yunus’s allies. Families of several detained political figures have reported no contact or information – raising fears they may have been extrajudicially harmed. Such practices mirror past patterns in Bangladesh (the previous government was also accused of disappearances), but the concern is the scale and vindictiveness may have worsened under Yunus’s regime, especially against those who might rally resistance.

- Financial and Institutional Undermining: Annexed financial records (Annex D in the full petition) point to suspected misuse of funds and corruption aiding the interim regime’s agenda. One notable claim is that USD \$29 million of aid (including U.S. grants) were siphoned through NGOs linked to regime supporters to finance destabilizing activities. There are references to USAID funds being diverted (this is currently an allegation under investigation). Additionally, evidence from the U.S. (including statements from former U.S. officials) suggest that some in the international community were misled about the nature of Yunus’s interim government, seeing it as a technocratic caretaker, whereas it was actually engaging in repression. This misdirection may have allowed the regime to secure legitimacy and resources while committing abuses.
- Leadership Culpability – Yunus and Associates: Central to the dossier is the role of Dr. Muhammad Yunus. Far from being an unwitting figurehead, Yunus is portrayed as the mastermind or instigator of the political upheaval. He himself essentially admitted that the movement which ousted Hasina was deliberately engineered – at a public event, he praised the “brains” behind the revolution and even identified the chief architect (one of his young aides) ([Yunus reveals 'brains' behind 'well-organised' protest that ousted Hasina - The Times of India](#)) ([Bangladesh's Yunus introduces Abdullah as 'brains' behind Hasina's ouster | World News - Business Standard](#)). This admission is a linchpin in linking Yunus to the initial coup. Once in power, the expectation might have been for Yunus, a reputed social business leader, to restore calm. Instead, the evidence paints him as presiding over – and failing to stop – the campaign of violence and revenge. The chain-of-command analysis in the legal brief shows that many of the atrocities were carried out by forces or mobs who were effectively under the interim government’s influence or control (for instance, local administrators and police often stood aside or cooperated with pro-regime mobs). Given Yunus’s position, the principle of command responsibility is invoked: he had effective authority and knew of the crimes, yet did nothing to prevent or punish them. Other figures named in the documents include leaders of the student protest movement who joined the interim administration and members of Islamist groups (e.g., Jamaat-e-Islami) who reportedly provided manpower for some violent actions. The petition essentially argues that Yunus and a coalition of extremist and opportunistic actors formed a joint criminal enterprise to violently remove the elected government and secure power through fear.